Stealing Signs: Is Professional Baseball\u27s United States-Japanese Player Contract Agreement Enough to Avoid Another Baseball War by Duncan, Casey
University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Journal of International Law
2004
Stealing Signs: Is Professional Baseball's United
States-Japanese Player Contract Agreement
Enough to Avoid Another Baseball War
Casey Duncan
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mjil
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota
Journal of International Law collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Duncan, Casey, "Stealing Signs: Is Professional Baseball's United States-Japanese Player Contract Agreement Enough to Avoid
Another Baseball War" (2004). Minnesota Journal of International Law. 211.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mjil/211
Stealing Signs: Is Professional Baseball's
United States-Japanese Player Contract
Agreement Enough to Avoid Another
"Baseball War"?
Casey Duncan*
INTRODUCTION
In 1998 U.S. Major League Baseball (MLB) entered into an
agreement with Japan's Nippon Professional Baseball (NPB)
league governing the transaction of non-free agent players be-
tween the two leagues. This United States-Japanese Player
Contract Agreement, also known as "The Posting System
Agreement" (Posting System) is designed to regulate such inter-
national player transactions and to protect the interests of both
leagues. While the Posting System has had some initial success,
recent developments make its long-term success as a solution
suspect. It is the purpose of this note to examine critically the
Posting System in light of these developments, and to suggest
possible changes to better effectuate its goals and protect the in-
terests of both leagues and their players.
This note examines the current agreement between the
leagues, points out its weaknesses, and finally, offers sugges-
tions that may help to create a more effective document. Sec-
tion one will raise some of the legal and financial problems fac-
ing both leagues under the current agreement, give a brief
comparison of the leagues, outline the circumstances underlying
the need for and development of the Posting System, and will
finally explain the details of the agreement. Section two will
give a survey of law relevant to the enforcement of athletic per-
sonal service contracts. Section three will explain potential
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problems in contract enforcement, explore the shortcomings of
the Posting System, and propose alterations and improvements
to the basic agreement and related league rules.
I. GET YOUR SCORECARDS IN TRANSLATION: THE NEED
FOR AND CREATION OF THE POSTING SYSTEM
Baseball is no longer solely the "American Pastime." Japan
and Korea have established leagues comparable to the MLB,
and other nations have begun to form similar leagues.' Roughly
half of all professional baseball players in the MLB system are
non-nationals. 2 While the large majority of foreign-born MLB
players are from Latin America, 3 there is a small but significant
number of Japanese players who have had an impact upon the
game far greater than their relatively small numbers would
suggest.4 Of the fifteen Japanese players active during the 2002
season, 5 three received the "Rookie of the Year" award after
their first MLB season, 6 and Seattle Mariner Ichiro Suzuki re-
ceived the most All-Star fan votes in each of the 2001, 2002, and
2003 seasons. 7
1. See William B. Gould IV, Baseball and Globalization: The Game Played
and Heard and Watched 'Round the World (With Apologies to Soccer and Bobby
Thomson), 8 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 85, 113 (2000).
2. On opening day of the 2002 season, foreign-born players occupied 26.1% of
all big-league rosters, while 44.75% of all U.S. professional ball players, including
minor league players, were from one of thirty-one different nations. See Wayne Cof-
fey, As the Baseball World Turns Global Draft Needed to Level the Playing Field,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, June 2, 2002, at 1C, available at 2002 WL 3148916.
3. See id.
4. See Peter Schmuck, International Pastime, BALT. SUN, Aug. 25, 2002, at
D1, available at 2002 WL 6967359; Wayne Coffey, Saying Sayonara, DAILY NEWS
(NY), Jan. 6, 2002, at 82, available at 2002 WL 3163035.
5. See Don Ketchum, Asian Players Make Major Inroads, ARIZ. REPUBLIC,
Mar. 17, 2002, available at LEXIS, News Library, Arizona Republic File.
6. See Jim Cour, Suzuki's Popularity Rises, CHI. TRIB., July 7, 2002, at 7,
available at 2002 WL 2672776; Masaru Ikei, The Ichiro Effect, SEATTLE POST-
INTELLIGENCER, July 10, 2001, at B5 (referring to Hideo Nomo and Kazuhiro Sa-
saki). Ichiro is only the second player to have received both the Most Valuable
Player award and Rookie of the Year in the same season. See S.L. Price, The Ichiro
Paradox, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, July 8, 2002, at 50.
7. See Cour, supra note 6 (stating that Ichiro received 800,000 more votes
than any other AL player and 400,000 more than the leading NL candidate in 2002);
John Shea, S.F. Trio Gets All-Star Call, S. F. CHRON., July 3, 2001, at Dl (Ichiro re-
ceived nearly 3.4 million votes in 2001, while Barry Bonds received 2.1 million votes,
the most in the NL.); John Follaco, All-Star Selection is Moment to Treasure, USA
TODAY, July 9, 2003, at 3C.
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The impact they have had on the MLB is overshadowed
only by their impact upon the sport in Japan.8 Like the MLB,9
the NPB has seen decreases in attendance10 and popularity in
recent decades, 1' but, by many accounts, the problems have no-
ticeably worsened since the mid 1990s, 12 just when Hideo Nomo
became the first Japanese national to play in the MLB in thirty
years. 13 Until the MLB's rekindled interest in Japanese base-
ball players in the mid-1990s, it was widely believed that Japa-
8. See Price, supra note 6, at 52; see also Schmuck, supra note 4; Coffey, supra
note 4.
9. See, e.g., Larry Eichel, If Baseball is Back, Fans Haven't Noticed: Atten-
dance is Off 4.6 Percent From Last Year, PHILA. INQUIRER, May 26, 2003, at F1,
available at WL 20393867; John Delcos, Baseball's Problem: Attendance or Profit
Margins, ASBURY PARK PRESS, May 11, 2003, at H3, available at LEXIS, News Li-
brary, Asbury Park Press File. Declining attendance and TV ratings arguments
should be taken with a grain of salt. Id. There are more fans of baseball than ever
before-they just make up a smaller portion of the overall larger population. Id.
The same can be said of TV ratings as broader channel selection generally means
more competition. Id. See also Mike Dodd, [Ishii] Rising, USA TODAY, May 2, 2002,
at 2C. Additionally, in Japan, the Central League, which includes the Yomiuri Gi-
ants, always outdraws the less popular Pacific League, which includes the Orix Blue
Wave, in both TV ratings and actual attendance. See Home Teams Hurting Without
Stars, NIKKEI WKLY (Japan), July 9, 2001, available at LEXIS, News Library, The
Nikkei Weekly File [hereinafter Home Teams Hurting Without Stars].
10. Orix Blue Wave attendance dipped thirty-seven percent in 2001 from 2000.
Ikei, supra note 6. Television ratings for the Tokyo Yomiuri Giants were also down.
Doug Struck, Japanese Gems on U.S. Diamonds, WASH. POST, June 5, 2001, at A01.
11. "'Every day people [in Japan] are watching major league baseball games,
and short term [sic], that's not so good for us,' says Steve Inow, the former general
manager of the Orix Blue Wave who sold the rights to Ichiro to Seattle in 2000."
Price, supra note 6, at 52. See also Nobuyuki Suzuki, Nomo Has Another Dream-
Pitching in the World Series, JAPAN ECON. NEWSWIRE, Dec. 28, 1995, available at
WL JWIRE Database; Ken Hijino, How are Our Boys Doing in the U.S.?, FIN. TIMES
(London), May 5, 2001, available at LEXIS, News Library, Financial Times File;
Robert Whiting, Batting Out of Their League, TIME (Int'l Ed., Asia), Apr. 30, 2001,
available at 2001 WL 17216124.
12. See Price, supra note 6, at 54. When Hideo Nomo pitched a no-hit game in
2001, the Yomiuri Giants suffered their lowest TV ratings since 1993, when Japan
League Soccer first began. Gordon Edes, Baseball Notes, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 8,
2001, at Dll. See also Nomo's All-Star Performance Sends TV Ratings Soaring,
JAPAN ECON. NEWSWIRE, July 13, 1995, available at WL JWIRE Database. In 1983,
Yomiuri Giants' yearly TV ratings peaked at 27.1, and have remained at around
twenty since the mid 1990s. Data Compilation, Video Research Topics (2003) (on file
with author). Similarly, Giants attendance in 1997 was 2,117,000, while in 2000 it
was 1,595,000. Id. Orix Blue Wave attendance in 2000 was 1,223,000 but fell to
1,079,000 in 2001. Id.
13. Hideo Nomo is only the second Japanese national ever to play in the MLB.
See Struck, supra note 10. The first was relief pitcher Masanori Murakami, who
pitched in 1964 and 1965 for the San Francisco Giants. Id. In 1914, Goro Mikami
was a Japanese player in the short-lived Federal League. Id.
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nese players could not play competitively at the MLB level. 14
The success of Hideo Nomo and Ichiro Suzuki, among others,
has shown the fallacy of this belief and has had a profound im-
pact on the outlook of Japanese players and fans.15 While play-
ers like these have rekindled the interest of both U.S. and Japa-
nese fans, this interest seems to be primarily in MLB baseball
and those Japanese players in it.16
The MLB is currently experimenting with ways to broaden
both its national and worldwide appeal,1 7 and professional
sports leagues in the United States, including the MLB, have
found that signing foreign players is one way to tap into new
markets across the globe.' 8 Signing top Japanese players has
greatly increased the MLB's popularity in Japan. 19 Japanese
fans watch MLB games in the morning before, or even during
work, 20 purchase MLB merchandise, 2 1 and read news stories
14. Bob Nightengale, Just How Big is Hideo Nomo?, L.A. TIMES MAG., Sept. 17,
1995, at 20, available at 1995 WL 9826910. "[W]e had accepted the idea that out-
standing Asian pitchers could fit in here, but not position players ... [n]ow, Japa-
nese League position players have to be evaluated in a different light." See Leonard
Koppett, Ichiro Forces Baseball to Re-Examine Itself, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER,
Nov. 23, 2001, at D6, available at 2001 WL 3571440; see also Mike Tharp, Peanuts!
Popcorn! Squid-kebabs!, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 4, 1988, at 60 ("The level of
Japanese baseball is generally considered somewhere between the U.S. major and
triple-A minor leagues.").
15. See Michael Zielenziger, With Japanese Players' Success in U.S., Interest in
Local Baseball Declines, KNIGHT RIDDER WASH. BUREAU, May 5, 2001, available at
LEXIS, News Library, Knight Ridder/Tribune News Service File. In 2000, by way of
the Posting System, Ichiro became the first Japanese position player to play in the
MLB. See Michael Farber, Rising Son, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Dec. 4, 2000, at 68; see
also Yankees Secure Bid for Talks with Hiroshima Pitcher Ramirez, JAPAN ECON.
NEWSWIRE, Feb. 7, 2003, available at WL JWIRE Database.
16. See Suzuki, supra note 11; see also Thomas Dillion, Ichiro, Ichiro, Ichinooo!,
JAPAN TIMES, Oct. 18, 2001, available at LEXIS, News Library, The Japan Times
File; Schmuck, supra note 4.
17. See Baseball Chiefs Plan Conquest of Europe, Taipei Times, at http://www.
taipeitimes.com/News/sport/archives/2003/03/18/198605 (Mar. 18, 2003).
18. See Tony Massarotti, Japanese Stars Hit Big Screen; Game Has Global Im-
pact, BOSTON HERALD, July 16, 2003, available at 2003 WL 3031447; see also Eric
Fisher, Going Global, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2003, at Al, available at LEXIS, News
Library, The Washington Times File.
19. See Schmuck, supra note 4; Coffey, supra note 4 (stating that MLB TV rat-
ings in Japan rose 300% in 2001, while merchandise rose 150% and sponsorship
partnerships reached a record high of fourteen in 2002, up from three in 2000).
20. See Daisuke Uozumi, American Sports Rumble in Japanese Market, NIKKEI
WKLY (Japan), July 9, 2001, available at LEXIS, News Library, The Nikkei Weekly
File. When Hideo Nomo first pitched against Ichiro, 20 million Japanese fans
watched the live daytime broadcast. Zielenziger, supra note 15; see also Price, supra
note 6; Chris Isidore, The Latest Japanese Import, CNNMoney, at http://money.
cnn.com/2002/01/22/news/column-sportsbiz/ (Jan. 22, 2002).
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written by the many Japanese foreign correspondents following
Japanese players in the United States.22 The popularity of the
MLB in Japan has helped to make MLB International become a
$100 million a year business, over ten times its value in 1989.23
Despite a recent slowdown in the MLB free agent market, which
may also affect the aggressive pursuit of NPB talent, the popu-
larity of the MLB in Japan shows little sign of abating.24
Japanese star players like Ichiro and the New York Yan-
kees' recently acquired Hideki "Godzilla" Matsui are not the
only ones experiencing success in the MLB, nor are they the
only ones attracting the attention of Japanese baseball fans.
The truly ominous sign for the future business stability of Japa-
nese baseball may lie in the success of "average" players like
Tsuyoshi Shinjo.25 Some see Shinjo's success as opening the
door for other average Japanese players to play in the MLB
rather than remain in Japan. 26 Perhaps the worst aspect of this
for the NPB is that many of these players are not necessarily
motivated by the MLB's higher salaries 27 so much as by the de-
21. "[Mlerchandise related to the MLB has been flying off the shelves." Uo-
zumi, supra note 20; see also Nightengale, supra note 14; Nomo is Winner in Mer-
chandising, Too, BALT. SUN, Aug. 13, 1995, available at 1995 WL 2459750.
22. The Mariners received seventy-five requests from Japanese media for press
credentials to cover Mariners games in Ichiro's first season. See Jim Caple, Get out
the Rice and Sashimi Grandma! Exodus Good for U.S., Not so Good for Japan,
SEATTLE POST INTELLIGENCER, Mar. 30, 2001, at F13, available at WL 3556278; see
also Ichiro Sees Less Media, Chance for Improvement, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 3, 2003,
available at LEXIS, News Library, The Miami Herald File (stating that 100 Japa-
nese media members were on hand for Matsui's first workout with the Yankees);
Skip Rozin, Godzilla to the Rescue?, BUS. WK, Mar. 3, 2003, at 95, available at
LEXIS, News Library, Business Week File (stating that more than 400 journalists
were at Times Square in New York when Matsui officially joined the Yankees).
23. Eric Fisher, The MLB Getting Serious in the Far East, WASH. TIMES, July
27, 2003, at C3, available at 2003 WL 7716196. In July 2003, MLB International
opened a permanent regional office in Tokyo. Id.
24. Id. The 2003 MLB All-Star game received higher TV ratings in Japan than
in the United States, despite the fact that it aired in the morning. All-Star Ratings
Better in Japan Than in USA, USA TODAY, July 21, 2003, available at http:/www.
usatoday.com/sportsbaseball/allstar/2003-07-2 1-ratings-japan-x.htm.
25. See Tim Larimer, The Shinjo Effect, TIME (Int'l Ed., Asia), June 11, 2001, at
45. Larimer conjectures that the "trickle of Japanese talent to the U.S. may soon
turn into a flood." Id.
26. Id. (stating that Shinjo's ability is "average, at best" and that "[niobody
thought he could cut it in the Major Leagues"). See also John Shea, Japanese Super-
star Draws Some Attention, S. FRAN. CHRON., Sept. 7, 2002, at C4, available at 2002
WL 4029640; Michelle Kaufman, Asians Entering, Playing U.S. Professional Sports
at a Fast Rate, MIAMI HERALD, July 31, 2002, available at LEXIS, News Library,
Miami Herald File.
27. See Hijino, supra note 11. Tsuyoshi Shinjo turned down a five-year, $12
2004]
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sire to merely play in the MLB. 28 This desire is often enhanced
by the players' growing dissatisfaction with the Japanese league
in general and an emerging preference among both players and
fans for the U.S. style of playing the game. 29
A. THE GAME OF INCHES: BASEBALL IN THE UNITED STATES AND
JAPAN
The approach and mindset of both Japanese players and
owners towards the game historically has been drastically dif-
ferent from their counterparts in the MLB.30 In Japan, baseball
has been infused with a more spiritual meaning, and is often
perceived as an embodiment of the Japanese cultural virtue of
"wa."3 1 Although there has been a Japanese players union for
some time, it was not until 1985 that it gained the power to
strike, which the players have never exercised. 32 Additionally,
free agency was unknown in the NPB until 1993, and is cur-
million deal with the Hanshin Tigers to sign a one-year, $400,000 contract with the
New York Mets. Id. When asked about the attitudes of young Japanese players,
Kenta Aoshima, a Japanese sports broadcaster and former professional baseball
player with the Yakult Swallows said, "The fundamental reason he [Tsuyohi Shinjo]
went abroad is the nature of Japanese baseball." Zielenziger, supra note 15. See
also Coffey, supra note 4 (saying that Shinjo was a "bargain"). Matsui turned down
a seven-year, $50 million contract with the Giants, opting for a one-year $6 million
contract so that he would still be eligible for free agency in 2003. Don Amore, Over-
seas Investments, HARTFORD COURANT, Oct. 30, 2002, at C1, available at 2002 WL
101512903.
28. See Hijino, supra note 11.
29. Id. See also Whiting, supra note 11 (stating that it is the freedom of the
MLB that is attractive to Japanese players); Bob Klapisch, Land of the Rising Stars,
REC. (Bergen County, N.J.), Aug. 16, 2001, available at LEXIS, News Library, The
Record File (quoting the Japanese Prime Minister as saying 'These days, watching
MLB is more exciting than watching games in Japan" and noting that fans find the
Japanese game "less thrilling than ever"); Schmuck, supra note 4 (quoting Hidemi
Kittaka of the Kyodo News Service); Japanese Develop Major League Taste, Sour on
Local Game, MAINICHI DAILY NEWS, Aug. 14, 2001, available at LEXIS, News Li-
brary, Mainichi Daily News File (reporting on a poll of 1,500 Japanese baseball
fans).
30. Id. See also Tom Koppel, Hitting Hard: Baseball Fever Sweeps Japan,
MACLEAN'S, Oct. 2, 1989, at 54 (ties are allowed because neither team loses face).
31. Japanese baseball historian Robert Whiting has noted that the Japanese
approach to the sport as a martial art has imbued the sport with a philosophical and
spiritual undertone which encourages harsh training practices. ROBERT WHITING,
You GOTTA HAVE WA 18-20 (1990). See also Barry Hillenbrand, Wa is Hell: The
Name of the Game is Besuboru, TIME, Sept. 25, 1989, at 87; Koppel, supra note 30.
32. See Andrew F. Braver, Baseball or Besuboru: The Implications of Antitrust
Law on Baseball in America and Japan, 16 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 421, 452
(1996).
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rently available only to players in an extremely limited form.33
Such changes have been slow and difficult because of the own-
ers' strength and traditional Japanese cultural views of collec-
tive harmony, company loyalty, and a tendency to promote the
benefit of the group over the individual. 34 A serious conse-
quence of this resistance to change is that the minimal gains in
free agency and pensions are unattainable for most Japanese
players as the typical career in the NPB does not exceed six
years. 35
While NPB owners have taken some initial steps to make
the game more appealing to players and fans, 36 many outside
33. Until recently, Japanese players had to play for either nine or ten years,
depending upon how they were drafted, before they are eligible for free agency. See
Hijino, supra note 11. The free agency rule was recently changed so that all players
need only play for nine years regardless of how they were drafted. Eligibility for Ja-
pan Free Agency Altered, JAPAN TIMES, June 18, 2003, at 21. In the first year of
NPB free agency, only five of sixty eligible players registered as free agents, and of
these, only four switched teams. Steven Brull, A Baseball Walkout in Japan? Uni-
maginable, Players Say, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Sept. 23, 1994, at 20. Japanese free
agency has, however, had the effect of boosting the average player salary by twenty-
seven percent and has encouraged team owners to offer multiple year contracts
which were rare before the advent of free agency. See id. By contrast, MLB players
need only play for six years before they are eligible for free agency, and the fre-
quency of free agents signing with new teams is much higher. See Shant H.
Chalian, Fourth and Goal: Player Restraints in Professional Sports, a Look Back and
a Look Ahead, 67 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 593, 608-09 (1993); see also Susan H. Seabury,
The Development and Role of Free Agency in Major League Baseball, 15 GA. ST. U. L.
REV. 335, 355-59 (1998) (discussing the advent and terms of the original MLB free
agency rules). The National Football League has created a complex system of free
agency that is somewhere between the NPB and MLB models. The NFL model re-
lies on four designations of free agency rights depending largely on the number of
seasons a player has been in the league. Scott E. Backman, NFL Players Fight for
Their Freedom: The History of Free Agency in the NFL, 9 SPORTS LAW. J. 1, 43-48
(2002) (discussing the 1993 NFL collective bargaining agreement's creation of the
unrestricted free agent, franchise transition player, restricted free agent, and exclu-
sive rights free agent designations).
34. See Brull, supra note 33, at 20. There is also a strong Japanese cultural
desire to avoid appearing greedy or lazy. Id.
35. See id. (noting that most pitchers' arms are worn out by age thirty and that
most players never become eligible for free agency); see also Scouting: Lots of Dia-
monds but Few Riches, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 1986, at A25 (stating that pensions
qualifications are set at nine years, "about three years longer than most of them can
hope to hang on").
36. See, e.g., Home Teams Hurting Without Stars, supra note 9 (The Oska
Kintesto Buffaloes hired Tommy Lasorda to provide advice both about playing tech-
nique and attracting fans.); Marty Kuehnert, Is Popular Tigers Manager Hoshin
Really a Hero or a Thug?, JAPAN TIMES, Aug. 13, 2003, at 23 (discussing an attempt
to raise officiating standards by using U.S. umpires); Dan Latham, Combining the
Best of Both Worlds, JAPAN TIMES, Mar. 28, 2003, at B9 (stating that the Nippon
Ham hired U.S. minor league manager Terry Hillman, who plans to infuse elements
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the game are concerned that these steps are too little too late
and that the exodus of talent and fan attention will continue.
37
There are some indications that owners may pressure highly
skilled and valuable players to request posting so that the or-
ganization can benefit from the potentially large cash bids. 38
There is reason to suspect, however, that the recent stagnation
of the MLB free agency market may slow MLB pursuit and ac-
quisition of Japanese talent, as the complete absence of MLB
bidding for Japanese closing pitcher Akinori Otsuka demon-
strates.39 While aggressive MLB pursuit of less-than-star Japa-
nese players via the Posting System may be currently faltering,
the recent contract between Japanese free agent star Hideki
"Godzilla" Matsui and the New York Yankees underscores the
precarious position of the NPB.40 Hideki Matsui was one of the
most popular and dominant star athletes in the NPB, 41 and, if
of the U.S. game); see also Paul White, Baseball in a Parallel Universe, USA TODAY
SPORTS WKLY, Aug. 13-19, 2003, at 54 (discussing Hillman); Hannah Beech, Chang-
ing the Game, TIME (Int'l Ed., Asia), May 3, 1999, at 46, available at 1999 WL
15941066 (noting that some practices, such as pelting players with line drives until
"they were bruised and shaking" and requiring pitchers to throw 300 pitches a day,
are fading in favor of more Americanized practice routines and schedules); Koppel,
supra note 30.
37. See supra notes 11-16. But see Wayne Graczyk, Big Leaguer Yoshii Rides
'Wave Home, JAPAN TIMES, Mar. 28, 2003 (discussing a possible "U-turn phenome-
non" of Japanese players returning to the NPB after playing in the MLB); Dodd, su-
pra note 9, at 1C.
38. Isidore, supra note 20 (discussing the Yakut Swallows' posting of pitcher
Kazuhisa Ishii).
39. See Don Amore, Free, But Not Easy; Stricter Budgets With New CBA,
HARTFORD COURANT, Nov. 14, 2002, at C5, available at LEXIS, News Library, Hart-
ford Courant File; see also Otsuka Gets Little Relief from Posting System, DAILY
YOM1URI, Dec. 20, 2002, at 24, available at 2002 WL 102532428; Matthew Tresau-
gue, Baseball's Free Agents Discover Soft Market, PRESS-ENTERPRISE, Jan. 13, 2003,
at C1, available at 2003 WL 5588514 (noting that All-Star catcher Ivan Rodriquez
was contemplating playing in Japan because of the depressed free agent market);
Steve DiMeglio, Ivan Rodriquez Frozen out by Frigid Free-Agent Market, SPORTS
WEEKLY, Jan. 8-14, at 29.
40. Kevin Davidoff, Stars of the East Go West; Yankees Give Matsui $21M for
Three Years, NEWSDAY, Dec. 20, 2002, at A102, available at 2002 WL 103519561.
See also George King, Godzilla's Bronx-Bound: Matsui & Yanks on Verge of Deal,
N.Y. POST, Dec. 19, 2002, at 94, available at 2002 WL 102531071. "If the leading
member of Japan's royal house of baseball [Hideki Matsui] deserts, the last taboo
will have been broken... either meaningful change will have to be made or there
may not be much of the Japanese game left to save." Whiting, supra note 11. "If
Hideki leaves, it's a tragedy .... It's bigger than Ichiro leaving. We depend on Hi-
deki for so much ... . It will be the beginning of the destruction of Japanese base-
ball." Price, supra note 6 (quoting Tokyo reporter Jun Ikushima).
41. See King, supra note 40; see also David Lennon, Ready for the Majors? U.S.
Teams May Import Japan's Marquee Players, NEWSDAY, Nov. 15, 2002, at A81,
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his current success in the MLB continues, the NPB can almost
certainly anticipate further declines in TV ratings and atten-
dance. 42 Similarly, MLB teams with Japanese players can ex-
pect to reap significant financial benefits through increased
tourism and attendance, 43 Japanese television contracts, 44 and
merchandise sales. 4 5
Another development that could have a negative impact on
relations between the MLB and NPB, as well as on the Posting
System, is the recent contract dispute between former Florida
Marlin Kevin Millar and the Chunichi Dragons.46 In January of
2003, Chunichi purchased the rights to negotiate with Millar
from the Marlins and signed him to a two-year contract.47 In an
unexpected twist, the Boston Red Sox claimed Kevin Millar off
of MLB waivers, a process he had to pass before he could for-
mally join the Dragons. 48 The Red Sox tried to negotiate a trade
for Millar with the Dragons, but the MLB interceded to enforce
available at 2002 WL 102169665.
42. See supra notes 16-22 (discussing the impact of Japanese players); see also
Rozin, supra note 22, at 95 (stating that the MLB expects to air between eighty and
100 Yankee games in Japan, up from less than twenty in 2002). The Yankee's first
game had an average of 11.1% of viewers in the Tokyo area, while TV ratings for the
first Yomiuri Giants game fell from 28.2% to 16.2% in 2002. Yankees Season Opener
Gets Top TV Ratings as Fans Tune in to Matsui Debut, at http://sports.yahoo.con
mlb/news?slug=ap-japan.matsui-tv&prov=ap&type=lgns, Apr. 2, 2003 (on file with
the author).
43. Yung Kim & Elise Young, Made in Japan, REC. (Bergen County, N.J.), Apr.
30, 2003, at Al, available at 2003 WL 4613877; Rozin, supra note 22, at 95 (stating
that several Japanese tourist agencies have purchased more than 1,000 Yankee
tickets for 2003 tour packages).
44. This year (2003) is the last year of MLB's five-year, $65 million contract
with Dentsu, Inc., and now the MLB "expect[s] to realize a significant increase in...
rights fees," according to MLB Senior Vice-President Paul Archey. See Rozin, supra
note 22, at 95; see also Ken Belson, Baseball, Coffee, and Godzilla, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
2, 2003, at S3 (stating that Japan network NHK plans to air 300 plus MLB games in
2003).
45. See supra note 21; Coffey, supra note 4; Rozin, supra note 22.
46. See Gordon Edes, Japan Claims Millar: Dragons Insist He is Their Man,
BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 22, 2003, at F6 [hereinafter Japan Claims Millar].
47. Gordon Edes, Millar Still Not Set: Dragons Aren't Sure He'll Show Up,
BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 28, 2003, at D1 [hereinafter Millar Still Not Set]; see also
Gordon Edes, Millar Confirms He Will Not Report to Japan, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 31,
2003, at E2 [hereinafter Millar Confirms He Will Not Report to Japan].
48. Millar rejected the claim, making him a free agent, but two sources claim
his rejection was not his choice. See supra note 47; see also, Gordon Edes, MLB: Sox
Can't Make Deal for Millar, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 20, 2003, at D3 [hereinafter MLB:
Sox Can't Make Deal for Millar]; Gordon Edes, MLB Will Stay Out: It Will Not Me-
diate Dispute Over Millar, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 1, 2003, at F7, available at LEXIS,
News Library, Boston Globe File [hereinafter MLB Will Stay Out].
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Millar's contract with the Dragons. 49 Millar then sought to have
the contract voided. 50 The MLB stated that Millar, since he was
not yet a free agent under the rules of either league, was gov-
erned by the Posting System agreement and would have to post,
like any other Japanese player, unless the contract was itself
invalid or the Dragons allowed Millar to back out.51 This would
have meant that for Millar to return to the United States to play
baseball, MLB would have had to submit sealed bids to the
commissioner to buy his rights from the Dragons. 52 The Major
League Baseball Player's Association (MLBPA) intervened on
Millar's behalf,53 but the MLB initially refused to mediate the
situation further than its previous decision as to the validity of
his contract.54 The Dragons decided not to force Millar to honor
his contract and play for them, but they were unwilling to re-
lease him.5 5 The Dragons were in an awkward position because
forcing Millar to honor his contract with them or sit out could
have led to a complete breakdown in both the Posting System
and MLB-NPB relations. 56 The Dragons were reportedly think-
ing of bringing a case against Millar in Japan, but officially had
not ruled out the potential of a trade.57 Meanwhile, the MLB
49. See MLB: Sox Can't Make Deal for Millar, supra note 48.
50. Millar Confirms He Will Not Report to Japan, supra note 47. Millar has
argued that his "change of heart" is no different than Noirihio Nakamura's backing
out of an agreement with the New York Mets in December, 2002. Id. MLB spokes-
man Patrick Courtney points out that Nakamura had merely agreed to the terms of
a contract with the Mets, and did not actually sign anything. See MLB Will Stay
Out, supra note 48.
51. See MLB: Sox Can't Make Deal for Millar, supra note 48. Millar's agents'
attempts to challenge the validity of his Dragons contract apparently failed, and so
Millar is contractually no different than any other Japanese player. Millar Con-
firms He Will Not Report to Japan, supra note 47; MLB Will Stay Out, supra note
48.
52. For more discussion of the Posting System, see infra Part I.C.
53. Millar Confirms He will Not Report to Japan, supra note 47.
54. MLB Will Stay Out, supra note 48. Millar failed to report to the Dragons
spring training on February 1, 2003, and reportedly the Dragons set a deadline re-
quiring him to join the club by February 10, 2003, or face a potential lawsuit for
damages. Id.
55. Chunichi Gives up on Trying to Convince Millar, JAPAN ECON. NEWSWIRE,
Feb. 5, 2003, available at LEXIS, News Library, JEN File; Gordon Edes, Millar Bid-
ing Time: Sides Working on Compromise, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 12, 2003, at F2. The
Dragons were leaning towards releasing Millar if the Marlins refunded the $1.2 mil-
lion they received for his rights. Id.
56. THE HOT CORNER: Dragons have Millar on a Barbecue, DAILY YOMIURI,
Feb. 6, 2003, at 24, available at LEXIS, News Library, Yomiuri File.
57. Gordon Edes, Millar Resolution in the Works, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 7, 2003,
at D2 [hereinafter Millar Resolution in the Works]; see also Gordon Edes, Can Bull-
pen by Committee Save the Sox?, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 9, 2003, at El0 [hereinafter
[Vol.13:l
STEALING SIGNS
approved a transaction in which Chunichi would void Millar's
contract, thus sending him back to the Marlins, who would then
trade him to Boston for the $1.2 million Chunichi initially
paid.58 MLB Executive Vice President of Baseball Operations
Sandy Alderson has been quoted as saying that the situation
had the "potential for some disruption" of current protocol and
relations between the MLB and the NPB, but added "[w]hich is
not to say the protocol agreement is perfect. . . ."59 The situa-
tion was finally resolved when the MLBPA successfully pres-
sured the MLB to threaten canceling the Seattle Mariners-
Oakland A's season-opening series in Japan if the Dragons did
not let Millar go without a legal battle. 60 The Dragons voided
the contract; the Marlins returned the $1.2 million purchase
price and then sold Millar's rights to Boston for $1.5 million. 61
Thus, the more restrictive aspects of the Japanese league
have made the chance to play in the MLB all the more appeal-
ing to Japanese players. 62 Conversely, MLB players appear to
have mixed feelings about playing in the NPB, but seem to gen-
erally view it as an acceptable alternative, particularly when
they believe that they will not receive the amount of playing
time or salary in the MLB that they could in Japan.63 Ulti-
mately, it is Japanese players that have expressed dissatisfac-
tion with their own national version of baseball, and, as will be
shown, attempts to act on this dissatisfaction led to the creation
of the Posting System.
Can Bullpen by Committee Save the Sox?] (discussing "kai-goroshi," which translates
as "keep to kill"). The Red Sox had a player, outfielder Benny Agbayani, who was
interested in playing in Japan. Bob Hohler, Trying to Find a Spot: Agbayani Regrets
Not Going to Japan, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 24, 2003, at D2, available at LEXIS, News
Library, Boston Globe File [hereinafter Agbayani Regrets Not Going to Japan]. Re-
portedly, the Red Sox tried to sell Agbayani's contract to the Dragons to both ap-
pease and compensate the Japanese team. Id. Agbayani later expressed regret that
the deal fell through noting that he would probably have played everyday and may
have also received a higher salary. Id.
58. Gordon Edes, Millar Closer to Deal, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 13, 2003, at D2.
59. Millar Resolution in the Works, supra note 57, at D2. Japanese officials
reportedly did not see the actions of the Red Sox as adversely affecting future deal-
ings with Japan. One is quoted as saying "for me personally, its business. They are
professional, we are professional .... Nobody is doing this just to make people
laugh," but added "[tihe whole thing is such a strain on the whole process of selling
and trading players to Japan. It sets the process back considerably .... Id.
60. Gordon Edes, MLB's Clout Helps Break Millar Logjam, BOSTON GLOBE,
Feb. 16, 2003, at F9, available at LEXIS, News Library, Boston Globe File.
61. Id.
62. Beech, supra note 36.
63. See supra notes 39 and 57 and accompanying text (discussing Ivan
Rodriquez and Benny Agbayani, respectively).
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B. THE REASONS FOR CREATING THE POSTING SYSTEM
In 1995, Japanese pitcher Hideo Nomo was able to sign
with the MLB by cleverly exploiting a loophole his agents dis-
covered in the standard NPB player contract.64 Essentially, this
loophole allowed Nomo to circumvent completely the NPB's
player mobility restrictions and sign as a free agent with any
MLB team simply by voluntarily retiring from his NPB club. 65
While Nomo's "defection" to the MLB initially sparked a hostile
reaction from Japanese fans and media, 66 his success turned
heads on both sides of the Pacific and inspired MLB teams to
sign several other Japanese pitchers in the following seasons.6 7
In the wake of Nomo's discovery and exploitation of this
loophole, Japanese teams scrambled to protect their interests in
their current players. One method, adopted by the Chiba Lotte
Marines, was the resurrection of "working agreements" that had
existed between some Japanese and MLB clubs in the 1960s. 68
Having secured such a working agreement with the San Diego
Padres, Chiba Lotte sold the Padres the exclusive right to nego-
tiate with their star pitcher Hideki Irabu, who had expressed a
desire to play in the MLB.69 Irabu, however, had made it clear
that he only wanted to play for the New York Yankees, and re-
portedly, Chiba Lotte gave him indications that his wish would
be honored before assigning his rights to the Padres. 70 With
this exclusive right, the Padres were the only team that could
negotiate with and sign Irabu. 71 Irabu protested the arrange-
ment, and went before a MLB panel to argue his position, which
was also supported by Gene Orza of the MLBPA General Coun-
sel's Office. 72 MLB Commissioner Bud Selig did not agree, and
64. See Agents of Change Always Unwelcome, DAILY YOMIURI, Dec. 28, 2000, at
26, available at LEXIS, News Library, Yomiuri File; Whiting, supra note 11, at 24.
65. The loophole had actually existed since 1963, but the NPB had neglected to
fix it and American teams had not considered it worth exploiting. See Agents of
Change Always Unwelcome, supra note 64.
66. Id.
67. See Ketchum, supra note 5.
68. Robert Nishihara, Turning Japanese: The Next Step in the Internationaliza-
tion at Major League Baseball, The Diamond Angle, at http://www.thediamondangle.
com/archive/mar02/japanball.html (Mar. 2002).
69. Id. See also Hal McCoy, Realignment Toned Down, DAYTON DAILY NEWS,
Sept. 7, 1997, available at LEXIS, News Library, Dayton Daily News File.
70. E-mail from Robert Whiting to Casey Duncan, author (May 14, 2003) (on
file with author).
71. Japan Says 'No' to Exclusive Trade Talks with MLB Teams, JAPAN ECON.
NEWSWIRE, July 16, 1997, LEXIS, News Library, JEN File.
72. Both Orza and the Yankees challenged the validity of working agreements
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Irabu, calling the Chiba Lotte-San Diego agreement "slave
trade," publicly stated that he would only sign with the New
York Yankees and threatened to sit out the 1997 season until he
was eligible for free agency under NPB rules.7 3 After several
months of tense negotiating with San Diego, the Yankees finally
reached a trade deal with the Padres in which they acquired the
rights to sign Irabu. 74 The NPB commissioner, however, in a
letter to the MLB, accused the Yankees of tampering and con-
ducting secret negotiations, and at least one MLB official
agreed. 75
In 1998, Hiroshima Tokyo Carp player Alfonso Soriano un-
successfully attempted to negotiate a higher salary through sal-
ary arbitration.76 The Carp had signed Soriano at the age of
sixteen in a Dominican baseball academy, and at the time of his
attempt to renegotiate his salary, he was only making $45,000;
the average salary for foreign players was closer to $220,000.77
He and his agent, Don Nomura, decided to ask for $180,000, but
Nomura was not allowed to attend the arbitration and Soriano
failed to convince the panel, made up of the commissioner and
the two league presidents, that he was entitled to an increase. 78
Under the NPB standard player's contract, Soriano could volun-
tarily retire if the arbitration panel refused his request.79
that granted MLB teams exclusive bargaining rights to Japanese players. See Jon
Heyman, Baseball Report: Yankees Strike out in Irabu Case, but Trade with Padres
Possible, NEWSDAY, Feb. 28, 1997, LEXIS, News Library, Newsday File; Japan Says
'No'to Exclusive Trade Talks with MLB Teams, supra note 71.
73. Japan Says 'No' to Exclusive Trade Talks with MLB Teams, supra note 71;
Baseball Report: Yankees Strike out in Irabu Case, but Trade with Padres Possible,
supra note 72. Irabu returned to Japan, but Chiba Lotte informed him they would
only renew his contract if he publicly apologized for the "slave trade" remark and
sign an agreement never to try to play for a MLB team again. See Team Tells Irabu
to Forget About Majors, COLUMBIAN (Vancouver, Wa.), Apr. 1, 1997, at D2, available
at LEXIS, News Library, The Columbian File.
74. John Gianmore, Inside Irabu, DAILY NEWS, July 9, 1997, at Sports 60,
available at LEXIS, News Library, Daily News File. Irabu signed with the Yankees
on April 22, 1997 for the sum of $12.8 million and a signing bonus of $8.5 million.
Id.
75. Id.
76. Jeff Pearlman, He's Arrived, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Aug. 26, 2002, at 40, 42.
A week before his salary arbitration hearing, Soriano and his agent, Don Nomura,
were notified that Nomura would not be allowed to attend and that Soriano would
have to present his claim without Nomura's aid. Id.
77. Id. at 41. See also Anthony McCarron, Star Wars: Alfonso Soriano is Sec-
ond to None, but it Took a Fight Against an Entire Country, DAILY NEWS, July 11,
2002, LEXIS, News Library, Daily News File.
78. See Pearlman, supra note 76, at 42; McCarron, supra note 77.
79. See Pearlman, supra note 76, at 42.
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After this failure, Soriano voluntarily retired and attempted
to utilize the Nomo loophole and sign as a free agent in the
MLB.80 The NPB, however, had already closed the loophole,81
and the Carp retained their exclusive rights to Soriano even af-
ter he had voluntarily retired.8 2 Although the Carp threatened
Soriano and any MLB team that signed him with legal action,
the MLB Commissioner's Office declared that it considered
Soriano an unrestricted free agent on July 13, 1998.83 The Yan-
kees then offered Soriano $3.1 million regardless of any legal ac-
tion taken by the Carp.8 4 With the MLB, MLBPA, and deep-
pocketed Yankees backing Soriano, the Carp balked at fully
pressing their legal claim, and the dispute ended quietly when
Soriano settled with the Carp8 5 and signed with the New York
Yankees on September 29, 1998.86
C. THE POSTING SYSTEM AGREEMENT
The Irabu incident caused severe embarrassment for both
leagues,8 7 but it was Soriano's defection that underscored the
need to create a new agreement not only governing respect for
the other league's player contracts, but more importantly, regu-
lating player transfers between the leagues. In 1998 the MLB
and NPB began to finalize the "United States-Japanese Player
80. Id. See also Jim Allen, THE HOT CORNER: Breaking the Law, DAILY
YOMIURI, Jan. 6, 2000, at 24, available at LEXIS, News Library, Yomiuri File. Sori-
ano's refusal of the salary arbitration determination was essentially the equivalent
of Nomo's "voluntary retirement." McCarron, supra note 77. See also Joel Sherman,
Soriano's Best Japanese Import, N.Y. POST, Apr. 30, 2003, at C9, available at
LEXIS, News Library, New York Post File.
81. Allen, supra note 80, at 24.
82. Id.
83. McCarron, supra note 77; see also, Pearlman, supra note 76, at 43. The
MLB declared Soriano a free agent because it refused to honor what it considered
the NPB's "unilateral attempt to alter the working agreement between Japan and
the majors." Allen, supra note 80, at 24.
84. According to Jean Afterman, then Nomura's legal assistant and now Yan-
kees Assistant General Manager, this commitment to legally back Soriano is what
clinched the deal more than the actual dollar amount. John Delos, Afterman Earned
Pinstripes by Playing Hardball, J. NEWS (Westchester, N.Y.) Mar. 31, 2003, at K2,
available at LEXIS, News Library, The Journal News File; see also McCarron, supra
note 77.
85. Soriano Proves High Price Tags are Overrated, BUFFALO NEWS, July 7,
2003 at C1, available at LEXIS, News Library, Buffalo News File.
86. See McCarron, supra note 77. Soriano has since become one of the MLB's
most dominant players and an All-Star second basemen. See Pearlman, supra note
76, at 44.
87. See Ketchum, supra note 5.
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Contract Agreement," which they entered into on July 10,
2000.88
The Posting System has several main purposes. First, it
eliminates inter-league legal controversies such as those that
arose during the defections of Nomo and Soriano.8 9 Second, by
requiring ownership consent to both the initial posting and the
acceptability of the bid amounts, NPB teams still retain signifi-
cant control over the release of their players. 90 Finally, it pro-
vides for a system of team compensation for waiving the rights
to the duration of a player's contract in much the same way that
the various professional free agency plans in the United States
provide. 91
The agreement regulates the inter-league transaction of any
non-free agent player, defined as those players on the "Reserve,
Military, Voluntarily Retired, Restricted, Disqualified, Sus-
pended, or Ineligible List of any Japanese Club."92 If a Japanese
player covered in this paragraph wishes to play in the MLB, his
team must first agree to his request, and then must notify the
NPB commissioner of the player's availability. 93 The NPB com-
missioner then notifies the MLB commissioner's office, which
then "posts" the player's availability to the MLB teams. 94 The
agreement requires that all such postings occur between
November first and May first of the following year.95 Once a
player has been posted, MLB teams then have a total of four
business days to submit a single cash bid to the MLB commis-
88. UNITED STATES-JAPANESE PLAYER CONTRACT AGREEMENT T 7 (2000) (on
file with author) [hereinafter POSTING SYSTEM]. Under the terms of this agreement,
it expired on December 15, 2002. Id. 17. The agreement further provides, how-
ever, that so long as neither commissioner gives notice of his intent to modify or
terminate the agreement and neither league "materially alters" its player reserve
rules or any special rule identified in the agreement, it will continue to be in force
from year to year. Thus, while the initial binding period of the agreement has ex-
pired, the agreement is still in force as to all of its provisions and requirements. Id.
See also Kuehnert, supra note 36.
89. See Ketchum, supra note 5.
90. POSTING SYSTEM, supra note 88, 7 9-12; infra notes 99-101 and accompa-
nying text (discussing TT 9-12).
91. See Chalian, supra note 33, at 612-16.
92. POSTING SYSTEM, supra note 88, T 5. This paragraph refers to the Japa-
nese Professional Baseball Rules of February 1, 2000 for the definition of these vari-
ous terms. Id. The agreement similarly applies to MLB players and player re-
straints. Id. T 2.
93. Id. 5.
94. Id. 8.
95. Id. 9.
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sioner's office.96 The MLB commissioner determines the highest
bid and notifies the NPB commissioner of the amount. 97 The
NPB commissioner then has four business days to contact the
posted player's team to determine if the bid amount is accept-
able and notify the MLB commissioner. 98 If the Japanese team
accepts the bid, the U.S. team then has the exclusive and non-
assignable right to negotiate a contract with the player for a pe-
riod of thirty days. 99 If an agreement results, the Japanese club
is entitled to the bid amount as consideration "for relinquishing
its rights to the player."100 If the Japanese player and the U.S.
team fail to reach an agreement within the thirty day period,
the MLB team retains its bid amount and the Japanese player
is ineligible for further posting or negotiations until the follow-
ing November first. 101
The Posting System Agreement has two final important
provisions. First, it allows for "working agreements" 10 2 between
teams of either league so long as they do not "provide a U.S.
Club with exclusive or preferential rights" to negotiate and con-
tract with players covered by the agreement. 103 Teams must file
the details of all such working agreements with both league
commissioners, either of whom may require the modification of
the agreement if he determines that the terms are either incon-
sistent with the Posting System or "not in the best interests of
professional baseball in that country."1 04 Teams proposing to
enter negotiations or player transactions under a working
agreement must immediately inform the MLB commissioner. 105
The MLB commissioner has full authority to enforce the agree-
ment against U.S. teams and, in the event of a violation, such as
direct contact between a Japanese player and a U.S. team, may
revoke the team's exclusive bargaining right and award it to the
next highest bidder.1 06 Second, the MLB commissioner may de-
clare null and void any contract between a Japanese player and
96. Id.
97. POSTING SYSTEM, supra note 88, 10.
98. Id.
99. Id. 11.
100. Id. 9.
101. Id. 12.
102. See generally supra notes 68-75 and accompanying text (discussing "work-
ing agreements" and Irabu); see also Davidoff, supra note 40 (referring to the work-
ing agreement between the New York Yankees and the Yomiuri Giants).
103. POSTING SYSTEM, supra note 88, 14.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. See id. 13.
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an MLB team if it resulted from conduct not in the best interest
of professional baseball or inconsistent with the agreement.10 7
II. DOUBLE PLAY: ENFORCING PERSONAL SERVICE
CONTRACTS IN A WORLD OF CONTRACT JUMPING AND
PLAYER RAIDING
Although the defections of Nomo and Soriano were the cata-
lyst for scrapping the old MLB-NPB treaty and creating the
Posting System, also providing significant impetus was the ex-
isting legal framework of enforcing personal service contracts of
professional athletes. Basic contract law plays a very important
role in the continued existence of sports leagues. 108
A. CONTRACT JUMPING AND INTER-LEAGUE PLAYER
COMPETITION IN THE MLB
Historically, inter-league competition generally occurred
when a new league formed and began to compete with an exist-
ing league for both players and fans. 109 In each situation, a pe-
riod of contract jumping and player raiding followed the emer-
gence of the new league." 0  Rival league-inspired contract
jumping has occurred no less than six times in U.S. professional
baseball, three times in the twentieth century."' The three
most notable periods involved the National League-American
League "Great Baseball War" and eventual merger in the early
1900s, the struggle between the AL-NL combined league and
the Federal Baseball League in 1914 and 1915, and the Mexican
League inspired defections in 1946.112 Finally, the racial inte-
gration of professional baseball and the resulting collapse of the
Negro Leagues in the late 1940s and early 1950s is probably the
most comparable to the present situation.1 3
107. Id.
108. See James T. Brennan, Injunction Against Professional Athletes Breaching
Their Contracts, 34 BROOK. L. REV. 61, 61 (1968).
109. See 1 ROBERT C. BERRY & GLENN M. WONG, LAW AND BUSINESS OF THE
SPORTS INDUSTRIES, 65-66 (1986).
110. See id.; Sharon F. Carton, Damning with Fulsome Praise: Assessing the
Uniqueness of an Artist or Performer as a Condition to Enjoin Performance of Per-
sonal Service Contracts in Entertainment Law, 5 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L. J. 197, 203
(1998).
111. BERRY & WONG, supra note 109, at 67.
112. See id.
113. See infra notes 137.39 and accompanying text. These situations differ from
other rival league situations because rather than a league being formed specifically
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Certainly the most powerful tool in the team's legal arsenal
against contract jumping players is the unique services doctrine.
Under this doctrine, first developed in the nineteenth century
English case Lumley v. Wagner,114 courts are more likely to find
the application of a negative injunction appropriate against an
athlete's contract than against normal personal service con-
tracts in other industries. 115 Philadelphia Ball Club v. Lajoie"16
is the seminal case applying the unique services doctrine to
sports contracts and inter-league "contract jumping."'117 Na-
polean "Nap" Lajoie was a star player for the National League's
Philadelphia team, and when his salary request in 1901 was re-
fused, he angrily left to play for the rival American Association
team across town. 118 His former club brought a suit seeking a
negative injunction to prevent him from playing for the Ameri-
can Association team. 119 Perhaps the most important aspect of
the case is the analysis the Pennsylvania Supreme Court util-
ized in determining that damages were inadequate. 120 The
court held that for injunctive relief to be appropriate, the team
must establish that the player had unique skills that "could not
easily be obtained from others."'121 In concluding that Lajoie
was indeed highly skilled and that a negative injunction was
appropriate, the court looked not only to his above-average
baseball skill, but also to his familiarity with his team and
teammates and to his overall reputation and corresponding abil-
ity to draw fans. 122
for competition with an existing league, they resulted from a shift in an aspect of
cultural perspective that brought the two leagues into a rivalry over fans and play-
ers. See infra notes 137-39 and accompanying text.
114. Lumley v. Wagner, 42 Eng. Rep. 687 (1852). Lumley is a somewhat famous
case involving an opera singer who broke her contract with one theater to perform
for another. Carton, supra note 110, at 198. The court refused to force her to sing
for the theater, but reasoned that if she were barred from singing anywhere else she
would choose to sing there rather than forgo being an opera singer. Id.
115. See BERRY & WONG, supra note 109, at 68.
116. Phila. Ball Club v. Lajoie, 51 A. 973 (Pa. 1902).
117. Carton, supra note 110, at 206.
118. See BILL JAMES, THE BILL JAMES HISTORICAL BASEBALL ABSTRACT 79
(1985); LEONARD KOPPETT, KOPPETT'S CONCISE HISTORY OF MAJOR LEAGUE
BASEBALL 94-95 (1998).
119. KOPPETT, supra note 118, at 94.
120. See Carton, supra note 110, at 206.
121. Phila. Ball Club, 51 A. 973, 973.
122. See id. at 974. See generally C. Paul Rogers III, Napoleon Lajoie, Breach of
Contract and the Great Baseball War, 55 SMU L. REV. 325, 325-26 (2002) (referring
to the skill of Lajoie).
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Less than a month after the Lajoie opinion, another court
refused to grant an injunction against another contract jumping
player in Brooklyn Baseball Club v. McGuire.123 At the conclu-
sion of a very brief opinion, the court stated that it was not sat-
isfied that McGuire was so talented or unique that his services
"could not be performed, and substantially as well, by others en-
gaged in professional baseball playing, who might easily be ob-
tained to take his place." 124  While the legal outcomes were
vastly different the practical effect was not, as Lajoie's contract
was sold to a Cleveland team and the Ohio courts refused to en-
force the Philadelphia Supreme Court's injunction. 125
The creation of the Federal League in 1913 again sparked a
period of player raiding and contract jumping. In Weegham v.
Killefer,126 the court refused to grant a negative injunction to
Weegham, owner of the Chicago Federal Club, against Killefer
because Weegham did not come before the court with "clean
hands" in the matter. 127 The same year, the court in American
League Baseball Club of Chicago v. Chase12s vacated a prelimi-
nary injunction issued against the ballplayer Chase because it
found that the existing player contracts were lacking in mutual-
ity of remedy. 129 The Chase court refused to follow the Lajoie
decision because it was against "other cases constituting the
weight of authority."130 Instead, the underlying policy of Chase
was that of personal freedom, and so it was not the place of the
court to "assist in enforcing an agreement which is a part of a
general plan having for its object the maintenance of a monop-
oly, interference with the personal liberty of a citizen, and the
control of his free right to labor wherever and for whom he
pleases ... "131
123. Brooklyn Baseball Club v. McGuire, 116 F. 782, 783 (E.D. Pa. 1902).
124. Id.
125. KOPPETT, supra note 118, at 95. The only real limit on Lajoie's ability to
play was that he did not travel through or play any games in Pennsylvania to avoid
arrest for contempt of court. See JAMES, supra note 118, at 79. Several other play-
ers in Pennsylvania likewise moved to teams out of state to avoid having injunctions
imposed on them. Id.
126. Weegham v. Killefer, 215 F. 168 (W.D. Mich. 1914).
127. Id. at 172-73. Granting injunctions is a discretionary function of the courts,
and here Weegham had induced Killefer to breach his MLB contract, and so
Weegham did not come before the court with clean hands when he attempted to pre-
vent Killefer from again breaching and resigning. Id.
128. Am. League Baseball Club of Chicago v. Chase, 149 N.Y.S. 6, 14 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1914).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 15.
131. Id. at 20.
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Thus, two separate applications of the rule were formed
during the "Great Baseball War" of the early 1900s, and in the
Federal League period, courts generally chose not to follow the
Lajoie opinion. 132 In the 1946 rivalry with the Mexican League,
instead of seeking injunctions against contract jumping players,
the MLB issued a policy that any player under a MLB contract
that signed with a Mexican League team would be barred from
the MLB for five years.133 There were still several players who
jumped to the Mexican League, 134 and when the league col-
lapsed in 1948,135 these players brought antitrust actions
against the MLB's policy. 136 Then, during the racial integration
of the MLB, the Negro League owners first found that their con-
tracts did not bar players from signing with MLB teams. 137 Not
only could they not prevent players from leaving via a negative
injunction, the MLB teams felt no obligation to compensate the
Negro League teams.1 38 The Negro Leagues changed their con-
tracts and some MLB teams infrequently gave monetary com-
pensation, but Negro League team owners were unwilling to
seek negative injunctions because they did not want to be per-
ceived as standing in the way of racial integration. 39
B. NEGATIVE INJUNCTIONS AND THE UNIQUE SERVICES
DOCTRINE
Baseball, however, is not unique in experiencing such inter-
league struggles for player contracts. Each major professional
sport has faced significant rival league competition at least
once. 140 Despite the early reluctance of courts to follow the La-
132. Id. at 15. But see Cincinnati Exhibition Co. v. Marsans, 216 F. 269 (E.D.
Mo. 1914) (following Lajoie).
133. WILLIAM MARSHALL, BASEBALL'S PIVOTAL ERA, 1945-51, at 49 (1999).
134. Eight MLB players signed with the Mexican League. KOPPET, supra note
118, at 227.
135. MARSHALL, supra note 133, at 63.
136. See, e.g., Gardella v. Chandler, 172 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1949); Martin v. Nat'l
League Baseball Club, 174 F.2d 917 (2d Cir. 1949); see also BERRY & WONG, supra
note 109, at 95-97 (discussing Gardella, 172 F.2d 402).
137. Alfred Dennis Mathewson, Major League Baseball's Monopoly Power and
the Negro Leagues, 35 AM. Bus. L.J. 291, 299-300 (1998).
138. See id.; Dr. Harry Edwards, The End of the "Golden Age" of Black Sports
Participation?, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 1007, 1049 (1997); John B. Holway, Baseball
Blackout, WASH. POST, Apr. 4, 1993, at C1, available at LEXIS, News Library,
Washington Post File.
139. See Kenneth L. Shropshire, Jackie Robinson's Legacy, EMERGE, Apr. 30,
1997, at 60, available at 1997 WL 11609302.
140. See Nassau Sports v. Peters, 352 F. Supp. 870, 872 n.2 (E.D.N.Y 1972).
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joie opinion in baseball cases, 14 1 Lajoie has become the "leading
case for the availability of specific performance against an ath-
lete."'142 The general trend has been to further relax the stan-
dards for issuing a negative injunction against professional ath-
letes.143 This is especially true as to the analysis of an athlete's
uniqueness and skill.144 Although the Lajoie court relied on the
fact that Lajoie was a "bright particular star" in the "baseball
firmament," the injunction it imposed actually covered two less
stellar teammates who had jumped their National League con-
tracts along with Lajoie. 145 Perhaps the most important aspect
of the case is that the court required the team only to establish
that the player had unique skills that "could not easily be ob-
tained from others."146 Later courts have followed the practical
outcome of Lajoie to such an extent that professional athletes
are often treated as prima facie unique. 147 Many commentators
seem to be uncomfortable, if not critical, of this expansion of the
uniqueness standard.148
Another twist added to the unique services analysis is best
evidenced in Winnipeg Rugby Football Club v. Freeman.14 9 In
Winnipeg, a team in the Canadian League sought an injunction
preventing two of its former players from playing for the Cleve-
One notable instance is Erving v. Va. Squires Basketball Club, 468 F.2d 1064 (2d
Cir. 1972), involving basketball legend Julius "Dr. J" Erving.
141. See supra notes 123-32 and accompanying text.
142. Brennan, supra note 108, at 63; see also Peter J. Bosch, Enforcement Prob-
lems of Personal Service Contracts in Professional Athletics, 6 TULSA L.J. 40, 47
(1969); Carton, supra note 110, at 206.
143. See Mark D. Scheffler, Injunctions in Professional Athletes' Contracts-An
Overused Remedy, 43 Conn. B.J. 538, 544-46 (1969); Brennan, supra note 108, at 71.
144. See Scheffler, supra note 143, at 544-45.
145. Rogers, supra note 122, at 333-35.
146. Phila. Ball Club v. Lajoie, 51 A. 973, 973 (Pa. 1902) (emphasis added); see
also Carton, supra note 110, at 206.
147. See Carton, supra note 110, at 207; JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND
PERILLO ON CONTRACTS 618 (2003); see, e.g., Nassau Sports v. Peters, 352 F. Supp.
870, 876 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); Central N.Y. Basketball, Inc. v. Barnett, 181 N.E.2d 506,
517 (Ohio C.P. 1961) ("Professional players in the major baseball, football, and bas-
ketball leagues have unusual talents and skills or they would not be so employed.").
But see Carton, supra note 110, at 207 (stating that "[the uniqueness] issue has not
reached the point of being removed from dispute at the trial level").
148. See, e.g., Scheffler, supra note 143, at 544; Michael D. Gallagher, Contrac-
tual Rights and Duties of the Professional Athlete - Playing the Game in a Bidding
War, 77 DICK. L. REV. 352, 360 (1973) (stating that recent cases have made "unique-
ness" meaningless).
149. Winnipeg Rugby Football Club v. Freeman, 140 F. Supp. 365 (N.D. Ohio
1955).
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land Browns. 150 One of Cleveland's coaches testified that the
players in question were merely "good" football players, but not
especially skilled or talented. 151 The judge, noting that he
would normally give great weight to such testimony, instead
found that "[t]he standard of special skill and exceptional ability
to some extent must have a relation to the class and character of
play."152 That is, an athlete's uniqueness is to be determined in
reference to the overall perceived quality of the team or league
that he is attempting to either leave or join.
The most notable feature of the contract jumping cases is
the conflict between underlying policies and the resulting incon-
sistency in outcomes. 153 Thus, one commentator can state that
"most courts have been fairly tolerant of the athlete's actions," 154
while another that "club owners... do not have much difficulty
in obtaining injunctions to restrain their ball players from pro-
viding services to others."1 55 Even when faced with nearly iden-
tical facts, courts have come to opposite conclusions as to the
appropriateness of a negative injunction.156 The most important
issue suffering from uncertainty is the permissible length of the
negative injunction. This is largely because when determining
the reasonableness of the contract, courts will look to the length
of the original contract, 157 but there is a countervailing policy
150. Id. at 365; see also BERRY & WONG, supra note 109, at 74.
151. Winnipeg, 140 F. Supp. at 366.
152. Id. The court further stated that "it seems reasonable to observe that ap-
praisal of skill and unique ability of a player, as they relate to contracts of this type,
must depend somewhat upon his prospects and potential." Id. Clearly, this holding
takes on special importance when the caliber of one team or league is considered su-
perior to the other because, no matter the athlete's talent level, he is likely to be
more valuable to a less established or "inferior" league. See Gould, supra note 1, at
106 n.79; Gallagher, supra note 148, at 361.
153. Gallagher, supra note 148, at 368 (stating that "the reasons why courts re-
ject lack of mutuality as a defense have varied greatly"); see also Rogers, supra note
122, at 344.
154. Carton, supra note 110, at 212.
155. Scheffler, supra note 143; see also Bosch, supra note 142, at 58.
156. See Robert C. Berry & William B. Gould, A Long Deep Drive to Collective
Bargaining: Of Players, Owners, Brawls, and Strikes, 31 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 685,
723 (1981). Compare Dallas Cowboys Football Club, Inc. v. Harris, 348 S.W.2d 37,
46 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961) (tolling option clause for player who sat out a season), with
Lemat Corp. v. Barry, 80 Cal. Rptr. 240, 243-45 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969) (refusing to toll
an option clause).
157. See BERRY & WONG, supra note 109, § 2.14, at 87. But a contract that re-
quires that the contract be tolled during the player's absence from the sport may al-
low an injunction to issue even after the contract would have expired. Id. See, e.g.,
Dallas Cowboys Football Club, 348 S.W.2d at 46 (tolling the year remaining in the
contract when player attempted to sign with another team after having sat out a
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that courts will not issue injunctions that impose great hard-
ship. 158 This policy is most frequently invoked when a team
seeks an injunction lasting several seasons because this would
essentially force the player to play for a team against his will or
entirely forsake his profession. 159 Because of the operation of
the various reserve systems and frequent use of single year con-
tracts containing an option clause to extend the contract prior to
the advent of free agency and multiyear contracts, the issue has
not been widely litigated, although there have been some
cases. 160 Courts will also presume that players have a limited
number of prime years and will be reluctant to enforce contracts
or injunctions which will bar the player from his primary means
of employment for a significant time.161
III. FOUL BALL: THE INADEQUACIES OF THE POSTING
SYSTEM AGREEMENT
Since its inception, the Posting System's only significant le-
gal hurdle has been the recent Kevin Millar dispute. Although
this situation was "unprecedented," other similar controversies
may well be looming. 6 2 The situation should serve as a wake-
up call to the potential and real weaknesses of the Posting Sys-
tem. Neither league should view the current Posting System as
anything more than a temporary solution which, for various
reasons stated below, both leagues should consider restructur-
ing to better protect the interests of both leagues and their play-
ers.
A. THE INFIELD FLY RULE: ENFORCING CONTRACTS IN THE
CONTEXT OF THE POSTING SYSTEM
Although the unique services doctrine is simply stated and
has become fairly standardized, the underlying policies are very
confused and often conflict. This is partly due to the fact that
the doctrine is only periodically applied against athletes and
sports leagues because of the temporal infrequency of rival
year).
158. See, e.g., Scheffler, supra note 143, at 543.
159. See id.; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 367(2) (1981).
160. See, e.g., Machen v. Johansson, 174 F. Supp. 522, 522 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Le-
mat Corp. v. Barry, 275 Cal. App. 2d 671, 680 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969); Arena Athletic
Club v. McPartland, 58 N.Y.S. 477, 478 (N.Y. App. Div. 1899).
161. See Carton, supra note 110, at 213.
162. See MLB Will Stay Out, supra note 48, at F7.
20041
MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE
leagues. Additionally, policies requiring an injunction in one
case would seem to require refusing one in another. Also, with
the doctrine now being imposed against all professional ath-
letes, instead of only true star athletes, as arguably the doctrine
ought to be enforced, 163 there is further potential for some odd
results. For instance, a star athlete or top prospect, such as
Ichiro or Soriano, is more likely to receive the support of the
league and team he is attempting to join. Because of the ex-
pense of litigation and the uncertainty of the outcome that the
various policy justifications may cause, it is entirely foreseeable
that a star player may be able to escape his contract and the
imposition of an injunction through a settlement, as did Soriano,
while a mediocre player, unsupported by a strong team or
league, is more likely to have an injunction imposed upon him.
It is often said that courts are loath to force an athlete to
choose between their profession and playing for a team against
their will, but this is exactly what the doctrine often does, even
if the length of the injunction is limited to a year or two.16 4 This
tendency is of less concern for occasional instances of contract
jumping, but makes the doctrine as a whole somewhat unsuit-
able and inefficient for regulating all player movement between
leagues. Thus, some sort of agreement that both enables and
regulates inter-league player movement is preferable so long as
it is designed to act like player transaction rules within a single
league. Clearly, resolving all intra-league player transaction
disputes by litigation and negative injunction would be highly
undesirable, and it should be no different in the case of two well-
established leagues that have begun to overlap in player and fan
base largely due to the proliferation of the global economy and
broadcasting.
There remain several legal questions as to the Posting Sys-
tem's enforceability in the event of a controversy. 165 A pressing
issue is the overall enforceability of Japanese player contracts in
the United States. 166 In the sports and entertainment context,
the "unique services" doctrine is the best way to prevent con-
tract jumping in the absence of an agreement such as the Post-
163. See, e.g., Scheffler, supra note 143, at 544-45 (discussing courts' tendencies
to consider "mere engagement as a baseball player in the professional league" evi-
dence of excellence and extraordinary abilities).
164. Id. at 553 (noting that injunctions are really specific performance of nega-
tive contracts).
165. See Gould, supra note 1, at 117-18 (discussing possible antitrust issues).
166. See supra notes 76-86 and accompanying text.
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ing Agreement. 167 U.S. courts will presume the uniqueness of
athletes, and if the contract is otherwise valid, will impose a
negative injunction against the player and any rival league or
team that attempts to sign him. 168 Courts will not, however,
always impose a negative injunction and the more restrictive
nature of the NPB leaves some doubts as to how U.S. courts will
treat their player contracts. Courts, however, have recognized
that even moderately skilled players have more value to less ac-
complished leagues. 169 Thus, if a Japanese player were to at-
tempt to jump his contract and sign with the MLB, this argu-
ment could have substantial persuasive value with a court, even
in spite of the NPB's more restrictive player contracts and prac-
tices. 170 Despite the expansion of the unique services doctrine
and some case rulings that arguably should make it easier for
NPB teams to get negative injunctions against players trying to
sign with MLB teams, 171 the implication of Soriano's settlement
with the Carp is that the team either suspected that Soriano's
contract was not enforceable in the United States or realized
that the costs of successful litigation outweighed any potential
remedy.
Legal disputes and contract wrangling need not originate
because of contract jumping, and contract enforcement and ne-
gotiation issues such as those recently involving Kevin Millar,
and to a lesser extent, Japanese player Norihiro Nakamura, 172
certainly will occur again. If the Dragons had utilized a "keep to
kill" tactic on Millar's contract, 173 the MLBPA certainly would
have pressured the MLB to allow Millar to re-enter the league.
This would have placed the MLB in a difficult position and
probably would have led to its utilization of the escape clause
now active in the Posting Agreement. 174 If the Posting System
collapses, the NPB in particular will be in a difficult position
and will almost certainly have to contend with some expensive
and largely fruitless contract jumping litigation in the United
167. See supra notes 114-17 and accompanying text.
168. This presumption is rebuttable. See Carton, supra note 110, at 216 (dis-
cussing Winnipeg).
169. See supra notes 149-52 and accompanying text.
170. Supra notes 30-35, 149-52 and accompanying text.
171. See supra notes 149-52 and accompanying text.
172. See Millar Confirms He Will Not Report to Japan, supra note 47.
173. See Can Bullpen by Committee Save Sox?, supra note 57 and accompanying
text (discussing Kai Goroshi).
174. See POSTING SYSTEM, supra note 88, 16 (allowing renegotiations or possi-
ble voidance of the agreement if either party has a "material change in its reserve
rules").
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States. 175 Ironically, Kevin Millar had placed the leagues in a
situation where the best way to maintain positive inter-league
relations also directly conflicted with the terms of the Posting
System. If the leagues had instead choose to act according to
the Posting System and forced Millar to sit out two years or
post, inter-league relations would have been severely
strained. 176 While the U.S. commissioner can void any agree-
ment between a Japanese player and U.S. team that is not in
the best interests of professional baseball, neither he nor the
NPB commissioner currently have the same power to void con-
tracts between Japanese teams and U.S. players. 177 If such a
power existed, there would have been a way for the NPB to save
face and resolve the issue without seriously jeopardizing inter-
league relations or the Posting System.
The NPB has borne the brunt of recent manifestations of
the inherent difficulty of preventing contract jumping; however,
the season-ending players strike in 1994 prompted some free
agents to sign with Japanese teams, which had Gordon Ash,
then general manager for the Toronto Blue Jays, expressing
concern about MLB players leaving for the NPB. 178 There is
speculation and some evidence that the depressed free agent
market may be a cause of the new MLB collective bargaining
agreement's luxury tax. 179 If so, then the NPB may become an
attractive alternative for some mid and top-level MLB talent
who have recently found themselves unable to command the
salary levels that comparable players have under existing con-
tracts. 18 0 Thus, it is ultimately in the interests of both leagues
to retain a system of regulation for inter-league player trans-
fers.
175. See BERRY & WONG, supra note 109, at 68 (explaining unlikely success of
lawsuits seeking damages, specific performance, and negative injunction when per-
sonal services contracts are involved).
176. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
177. See POSTING SYSTEM, supra note 88, 13.
178. See Richard Griffin, Land of Rising Sun Beckons Ballplayers, TORONTO
STAR, Sept. 20, 1995, at El [hereinafter Land of Rising Sun] ("[Fluture signings
would endanger the mutual hands-off agreement and... the offending Japanese
could expect repercussions.").
179. See, e.g., Amore, supra note 39, at C5; Peter Schmuck, Economy Causing
Depression in Signings: With Teams Cutting Payroll, Free Agents Attracting Little
Interest at Meetings, BALT. SUN, Dec. 15, 2002, at 5D, available at LEXIS, News Li-
brary, Baltimore Sun File.
180. See Land of Rising Sun, supra note 178, at El.
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B. DOWN ON STRIKES: THE POSTING SYSTEM DOES NOT
ADEQUATELY PROTECT THE NPB'S INTERESTS
Many have argued that the Posting System may actually
expedite the decline of the NPB rather than preserve it as in-
tended.18 1 This fear is valid. If Japanese baseball fans continue
to divert their attention and money towards U.S. baseball, NPB
owners may have no viable alternative other than to post play-
ers in an effort to offset revenue lost to MLB baseball.18 2 Ironi-
cally, it is the loss of star players that has the most adverse ef-
fects on league revenue,1 8 3 but it is these same star players who
can earn their NPB team a substantial Posting System bid.18 4
With each successive posting, the NPB may dig itself into a
deeper financial hole, receiving relatively minimal benefits at
the greater cost of escalating future losses.18 5 The temptation
for a franchise to seek this sort of compensation for a player it
may soon lose to free agency is obvious.18 6 Thus, rather than be-
ing the solution the NPB sought, many argue that the system
will reduce the NPB to the status of a farm system for the
MLB.187
181. See, e.g., Price, supra note 6, at 52 (noting a decline in attendance and TV
ratings for Japanese baseball); Caple, supra note 22, at F13 (discussing Japanese
fears of losing their star players to U.S. major leagues and a possible decrease in
Japanese baseball popularity); Larimer, supra note 25, at 45 (alluding to possible
adverse impacts on Japanese baseball caused by the disparity between soaring
American baseball salaries and decent Japanese players' cut-rate salaries); Isidore,
supra note 20 (noting that the new Posting System has the "potential to feed the
U.S. teams with a supply of reasonably-priced stars" and it will "dampen fans' appe-
tite for Japanese baseball").
182. See Isidore, supra note 20.
183. See Gallagher, supra note 148, at 353 (discussing the "impact that a super-
star can have on the fortunes of a team" and the typical method of inducement of
offering substantially more money than the player is receiving from their present
team).
184. Id. at 354.
185. Compare Mason Nakadomari, The Future Relationship of the Baseball Su-
perpowers, National Pastimes (Oct. 6, 2002) (on file with author) (arguing that the
NPB will not collapse as have other baseball leagues competing with the MLB be-
cause the MLB cannot steal its audience), with Uozumi, supra note 20 (discussing
the MLB's attempts to expand into the Japanese market with merchandise and TV
broadcasts by tapping the growing popularity of Japanese players in the major
league).
186. The Mariners paid Ichiro's former Japanese team, the Orix Blue Wave, over
$13 million just to sit down at the bargaining table with him. See Price, supra note
6, at 54. The Yakult Swallows similarly received $11.25 million from the Los Ange-
les Dodgers for pitcher Kazuhisa Ishii. See Isidore, supra note 25.
187. See Farber, supra note 15, at 12 (quoting MLBPA's Japanese representa-
tive Peter Miller as saying, "the posting system will only accelerate the trend [of the
Japanese leagues becoming a U.S. farm system] ... this is a bonanza for Japanese
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Unfortunately for the NPB, its troubles arise not from the
Posting System itself, but rather from its interaction with the
league's rules and practices.188 Players are leaving because they
are dissatisfied with the NPB, not because of the Posting Sys-
tem,189 which merely establishes a regulated procedure by which
dissatisfied players may leave. Its real force as a protective in-
strument comes from the MLB's agreement to respect Japanese
player contracts outside of the Posting System and from the lim-
ited control it gives NPB team owners over the timing of player
transfers.1 90 Despite this element of control, the Posting System
may actually create incentives for Japanese players to leave the
NPB sooner rather than later. The Posting System provides the
quickest opportunity for any player who would be happier play-
ing for a different team or for higher wages to get out of his cur-
rent contract. A player who would prefer to play for another
NPB team, but who is unwilling to complete his contract with
his current team, may decide to seek posting instead. Cur-
rently, only four players have utilized the Posting System. 191
But this may soon change. Reportedly, Ichiro threatened to
jump his contract, and when the Orix owners realized they were
going to lose Ichiro either immediately to a contract breach or
the following year to free agency, they posted him.192 Thus, both
players and owners have incentives to post before free agency;
players avoid the full time restraints of their contracts and own-
ers are able to convert a certain loss to a potentially substantial
gain.193
As has been mentioned, the Posting System also skews the
interests of NPB management and ownership.1 94 This is par-
ticularly true since NPB ownership can refuse inadequate bids,
clubs. Financially strapped teams will start doing it more often. Instead of opposing
a posting ... they're going to be pushing it"). See also Whiting, supra note 11.
188. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
190. See supra text accompanying notes 43-45, 100.
191. See Yankees Secure Bid for Talks with Hiroshima Pitcher Ramirez, supra
note 15 (noting that as of February 7, 2003, Ramon Ramirez is the fourth player to
draw a bid under the Posting System, after Ichiro Suzuki, Kazuhisa Ishii and Ale-
jandro Quezada).
192. See Beech, supra note 36.
193. See supra notes 111-21 and accompanying text; see also Beech, supra note
36 (noting the nine-year time constraint for Japanese players to be eligible for free
agency and suggesting that under the Posting System a "ball club can place a player
on the international market and sell him to the highest bidder").
194. See Gould, supra note 1, at 115; see also supra notes 36-38 and accompany-
ing text.
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and so risk nothing by the mere act of posting a player. 195 How-
ever, every time a star or popular NPB player posts successfully,
his absence not only weakens the commercial appeal of the
league and competitiveness of the team, but also adds to the
strength of its commercial rival. 196 Additionally, since the Post-
ing System only allows monetary compensation for posted play-
ers, the MLB does not sacrifice any of its future commercial
competitiveness. 197 Thus, the end result may be a vicious snow-
balling effect in which each successive posting makes necessary
a subsequent one as the MLB increases its overall attractive-
ness to Japanese fans and competitive strength over the NPB.
If such a trend continues long enough, the NPB could essen-
tially become a "farm" or "feeder" league for the MLB, and the
NPB could be reduced to developing talent only to sell it in an
attempt to keep the team from financial ruin or popular obscu-
rity. While the great distance separating the leagues may slow
the process, the history of multi-league competition for fans and
players has thus far only resulted in the collapse or incorpora-
tion of the weaker league. 198
C. FULL COUNT: POTENTIAL MLB PROBLEMS WITH THE POSTING
SYSTEM
The Posting System poses problems for the MLB as well.1 99
First, because the Posting System allows only monetary com-
pensation, wealthier teams are in a better position to obtain the
best Japanese players.200 To sign a top Japanese player, a MLB
team must be able to out-bid its rivals, and as each team may
make only one blind bid, there is a strong temptation to bid
high. This raises special problems for less financially stable
teams who either need or want the player or know that their
team is especially attractive to the posted player. Obviously,
195. See supra text accompanying notes 98-101.
196. See supra notes 17-24, 36-38, 185 and accompanying text.
197. See Chalian, supra note 33, at 612-16. U.S. league rules often require that
compensation for inter-team player transactions be in the form of current players or
future draft picks. Id. at 613. Under a system of purely monetary compensation,
this result is more indirect and only occurs if the team receiving the compensation
directs the money to the recruitment or development of additional talent. Id.
198. See BERRY & WONG, supra note 109, at 65-66. It should be noted that geo-
graphic distance did not protect Russian professional hockey from losing its talent to
the NHL. See Whiting, supra note 11.
199. See Edes, Millar Resolution in the Works, supra note 57; see also notes 46-
59 and accompanying text (discussing the Kevin Millar NPB contract controversy).
200. See POSTING SYSTEM, supra note 88, 9.
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the system greatly favors' teams that have financial resources
not invested in current talent, as opposed to traditional player
for player trades in which teams are more competitively bal-
anced. Additionally, the nature of the bidding process may yield
a situation in which the team making the highest bid is not in
the position to make an attractive offer to the player, potentially
opening the way for an antitrust suit brought by the acquired
player.201 The real effect of this is that teams with larger budg-
ets are in a better position to acquire Japanese players, whereas
in other trade situations teams are on more equal footing as
players and draft picks are more evenly distributed among the
teams.20 2 Although wealthy teams have a similar competitive
advantage in the domestic free agent market, they do not have
similar exclusive bargaining rights and small market teams
may attract players for reasons which are not exclusively finan-
cial.203
Also, the fact that a player may only be posted once a year
may create both an incentive and a corresponding ability for a
MLB team to attempt to prevent a rival from signing a needed
or desired player. 204 This could be accomplished by simply en-
tering an unusually high bid and then engaging the player in
hard bargaining. 205 Since the Japanese team only receives the
bid amount if the player signs a contract, such a strategy might
very well work. This strategy may have an added benefit to the
blocking team in that it might be able to sign a quality player
for much less than his actual market value. Considering that
current trends show U.S. teams with successful Japanese play-
201. See Gould, supra note 1, at 115-16 (explaining that "some teams may want
to keep the player off the market and to provide the highest bid, knowing that their
bargaining stance makes a contract with the player impossible since no dispute reso-
lution mechanism such as arbitration is contained in the agreement").
202. See Chalian, supra note 33, at 612-13 nn.131, 133, 136 & 139; see also su-
pra note 197.
203. See Chalian, supra note 33, at 613 nn.136 & 139.
204. While this may seem a bit unrealistic, teams frequently enter player trans-
actions with a view not only to strengthen their team but as a means of preventing a
close rival from gaining a competitive edge. See, e.g., Bob Hohler, Yankees Cut Red
Sox Out of Colon Deal, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 16, 2003, at E3, available at 2003 WL
3375150. Although Brian Cashman, the Yankees General Manager, denies that
they entered a three-way trade with the Montreal Expos and Chicago White Sox to
"try to prevent Boston from getting better," he does admit that the result was a
"fringe benefit." Id.
205. See Gould, supra note 1, at 115; see also George King, Torre to The Boss:
Place Blame on Me, N.Y. POST, Feb. 7, 2003, at 110, available at 2003 WL 5134189
(noting that "With Steinbrenner's dislike of the Red Sox at an all-time high, The [sic]
Boss could . make a ridiculously high bid for [Millar] ... ").
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ers become immensely popular in Japan, revenue from mer-
chandise, tourism, and other such sources may alleviate any fi-
nancial setback incurred by this strategy.206
D. CALL TO THE BULLPEN: A PROPOSED MODIFICATION OF THE
POSTING SYSTEM
The inadequacies of the Posting System are really functions
of problems already existing in each league. 207 The agreement
itself can and ought to be altered to better effectuate the inter-
ests of all parties, but the leagues should also alter their prac-
tices and rules to better protect their mutual interests.
In many respects, the current situation between the NPB
and the MLB is similar to the early league rivalries in U.S.
baseball history. 208 One key difference, however, is that the
weaker league is the one with the more restrictive player re-
straints, while typically in inter-league competition, it is the
start-up league which would offer better incentives to players to
challenge the more established league. 209 The NPB should note
this and do what it can to make its terms more attractive to
those in the MLB. While the geographic separation of the
leagues and the popularity of the sport in Japan make a com-
plete collapse very unlikely, 210 the NPB can and will decline
unless it takes steps to create better incentives to retain, de-
velop and attract highly talented players. 211 But with Japanese
dissatisfaction with the NPB rising and the stiff restraints on
player mobility even within the NPB, the Posting System ap-
206. See, e.g., Price, supra note 6, at 52; Uozumi, supra note 20, at 1 (reporting
that more exposure of the MLB brand name in Japan would raise more revenues
from consumer product sales, television rights fees, sponsorship fees, and event
ticket fees).
207. For example, the current disparities between each league's appeal to base-
ball players. See supra notes 33-38.
208. See supra notes 111-13; see also Nakadomari, supra note 185 (analogizing
the current tension between NPB and MLB to that between the Negro National
League and MLB, in that MLB drained away talent from the League once it realized
the availability of talented players at a cheaper price).
209. This actually makes the situation very comparable to the collapse of the
Negro Leagues with the racial integration of the MLB. See Mathewson, supra note
137, at 298-301 (pointing out the Negro League's inability to "afford team synergy
and an extremely weak employment contract system"); Kenneth L. Shropshire,
Where Have You Gone, Jackie Robinson?: Integration In America in the 2Pt Century,
38 S. TEX. L. REV. 1043, 1049 (1997) (explaining that the absence of signed contracts
and lack of financial incentives for black players were the causes of the Negro
League collapse).
210. See supra note 185.
211. See supra note 185.
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plies pressure on the league that is the exact opposite of what it
should be if the intent was to slow or control the drain of talent
from the NPB to the MLB.
Although the prestige of the MLB is probably the main rea-
son Japanese players leave the NPB,2 12 the length of the service
required to qualify for NPB free agency, along with other as-
pects of the league, such as the disparity in bargaining power,
grueling practices, short careers and low wages, are also highly
determinative factors. 213 The NPB should therefore seriously
consider restructuring its free agency system to create incen-
tives for talented players to stay in the league. The NPB could
retain its nine year requirement for unrestricted free agency
and alter the practice of posting a player only in his last season
or two into a hard rule that only players with seven years in the
league are eligible for posting, but implement a NPB-only "de-
mand to trade right" sometime toward the middle of a player's
contract. 214 This would give NPB players rights comparable to
their MLB counterparts and also provide incentives to remain in
the league. 215 That is, players in the NPB system would have
more power and flexibility in shaping their careers within the
league before they were eligible to post, thus giving them an op-
portunity to switch teams or to negotiate better deals without
having the Posting System as the sole resort. Also, these
changes would give owners more incentive to treat players
fairly, thus removing the opportunity to treat some players un-
fairly. At this point, it should be remembered that Alfonso Sori-
ano's failed attempts to improve his NPB contract is what led to
his decision to retire and sign with the Yankees. 21 6 Addition-
ally, it would also seem that the Japanese cultural virtues al-
ready discussed would prevent these limited but more expansive
rights and options from having the same arguably ill effects in
Japan that some have argued they have had in the MLB.217
212. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
213. See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
214. See Seabury, supra note 33, at 358 (explaining similar rule in the MLB).
215. Id.
216. See supra notes 76-82 and accompanying text.
217. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text (discussing Japanese idea of
"wa" and communal harmony). See also Tracy Ringolsby, Player Salaries a Casualty
of Labor War, ROcKY MOUNTAIN NEWS (Denver), Dec. 3, 1995, at 15B, available at
LEXIS, News File, Rocky Mountain News File (discussing the growing disparity be-
tween super star salaries and those of other players); Richard Griffin, If Jay's Offer
is Competitive, Leiter Should Stay, TORONTO STAR, Nov. 24, 1995, at C6, available at
LEXIS, News File, Toronto Star File, (noting the high turnover of players in the
MLB but also arguing that it is an improvement over the reserve system).
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The system could be further tailored to create correspond-
ing rights and obligations on NPB players and teams, depending
on whether the player exercised his "demand to trade right."
For instance, the initial "demand" right could be merely a right
to request, which, if refused, would make the player an unre-
stricted free agent after seven years instead of nine. Addition-
ally, a player whose request was refused should receive some
sort of accelerated compensation for the seasons between the re-
fusal and his seventh season.218 Players who do not exercise
this right, could gain a true right to demand to be traded or
posted after seven years, which if not granted by some point
within the Posting System window, would render the player an
unrestricted free agent. 219 Players who exercised the earlier
right should also have some sort of right to refuse a limited
number of trades or retract their request if none of the proposed
trades are to their liking.220 Further, players who refuse a trade
or retract their request should be treated as not having made
the request and thus retaining the second right to demand a
trade or posting. Players who exercise the initial right and suc-
cessfully enter a second contract must play out their remaining
contract for their new team, and would still be eligible, but could
not demand to be posted after their seventh season. 221 Players
who do not exercise any of these rights would play under what
would amount to the current NPB free agency rules. 222 While
this structure is complex, it is no more so, nor more rigid than,
many U.S. sports league free agency rules. At the same time it
would encourage players to remain in the NPB and encourage
NPB teams to act more competitively amongst each other and
with the MLB, but would still allow them to post players as nec-
essary. It should be noted, however, that any substantial
change to either leagues' rules allows the other league to re-
negotiate or rescind the agreement within ten days of notifica-
tion.223
As has been mentioned, the exclusive bargaining rights
granted under the Posting System favor wealthier teams and
218. See Backman, supra note 33, at 45 (describing franchise and transition
player status in the NFL).
219. See Seabury, supra note 33, at 358 (explaining similar rule in the MLB).
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. See Backman, supra note 33, at 43-45 (describing four types of free agent
players: unrestricted free agents, franchise and transition players, restricted free
agents, and exclusive rights free agents); Seabury, supra note 33, at 358-59.
223. See POSTING SYSTEM, supra note 88, 16.
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also could lead to potential abuses. 224 It should also be noted,
however, that the very exclusivity of the rights granted is a
large part of the incentive for teams to bid. Thus, altering the
exclusive nature of the bargaining could adversely affect a
team's willingness to place high bids, in part because a plural
right is worth less and also because a more competitive bargain-
ing process would likely result in teams allocating funds from
the bid compensating the NPB team, to the contract amount of-
fered to the player. This would certainly alleviate any skewed
incentives NPB ownership has in posting players for short-term
profit, but it would also increase long-term loss, as the team
would have fewer funds to use in acquiring or developing fresh
talent. A plural bargaining right would only be effective, and
suitably compensate the NPB team, if every team wishing to
participate paid a set and irrevocable entry fee. This would
spread the cost among MLB teams, make access to Japanese
talent through the Posting System more equitable between
strong and weak MLB franchises, and would ensure at least
some profit for the NPB team even in the event no MLB contract
was reached. Depending on how high the entry fee was set and
the number of interested MLB teams, it could also encourage
more postings of mediocre players, who usually receive a much
smaller bid amount than talented players for whom NPB teams
can expect to receive greater compensation in the current closed
bidding system.
Although this alteration would alleviate some potential
problems within the framework of the Posting System, it does
not alleviate the problems manifested during Irabu's contract
negotiation. 225 The problem is complicated by the fact that the
current Posting System allows working agreements between
MLB and NPB teams as long as exclusive negotiating rights are
not one of the terms. 226 In a plural bargaining situation it will
be more difficult for the commissioners to police the process to
ensure that a working agreement has not unfairly tainted the
negotiation process. 227 This is not to say, however, that the
leagues cannot amend the process to address both problems. As
mentioned, one potential solution would be to require that the
Japanese team receive set and irrevocable negotiation fees from
all interested MLB teams.
224. See supra notes 199-206.
225. See supra notes 68-74.
226. See POSTING SYSTEM, supra note 88, 14.
227. See supra notes 102-05 and accompanying text.
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Alternatively, prior to the bidding process the player could
submit a sealed list of teams that he would prefer to play for.
The commissioner would then send both the top actual bid and
the top bid, if any, from the player's list. The NPB would then
determine if the high bid amount was acceptable, just as it does
now, but in the event that it was, the player would then negoti-
ate with both teams, the NPB team retaining a certain percent-
age of both winning bids regardless of whether an agreement
with the player results, or the entire bid of the team the player
reached an agreement with. This would at least partially en-
sure that teams are sincere in their efforts to sign the player
and would also give the player a better chance to strike a good
deal with a team he sincerely wanted to play for.228 Addition-
ally, it would also mean that less financially endowed teams,
that nonetheless had other factors attractive to the player, could
effectively compete for his services. Although it could have the
effect of slightly lowering bid amounts, the fact that the NPB
team is guaranteed to receive at least some compensation would
offset this effect. Another added benefit is that it more accu-
rately reflects the nature of the transaction. That is, the bid
amount is expressly "consideration for the Japanese Club relin-
quishing its rights to the player,"229 but there is no considera-
tion for allowing a team the near exclusive right to negotiate, a
right which certainly has some value.
Finally, it is worth considering whether players could be
used as bids, much like inter-league player-for-player trades.
Certainly there are players in the MLB, like Benny Agbayani,
who would like to play in Japan, and allowing teams to bid in
the alternative, that is, the current cash bid, or alternatively a
player or player plus some cash, would further allow smaller
teams to compete for players. 230 It should also be remembered
that the Posting System is designed to govern player transac-
tions going both ways across the Pacific, and while the current
traffic has largely been one way, it is a possibility that MLB
players will be posted in the future. The NPB is certainly capa-
ble of attracting MLB talent, and should consider importing
more foreign talent to offset the loss of their top stars and to po-
228, See supra notes 199-206 and accompanying text.
229. See POSTING SYSTEM, supra note 88, 16.
230. See Agbayani Regrets Not Going to Japan, supra note 57 and accompanying
text. See also DiMeglio, supra note 39, at 29 (discussing the possibility of Ivan
Rodriquez playing in Japan); Land of Rising Sun, supra note 178, at E1 (discussing
MLB players leaving to play in Japan because of the strike-shortened season).
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tentially attract more fans. Allowing player-for-player alternate
bids may be the strongest incentive that Japanese teams could
offer, although that is not to say that many MLB teams would
not also be interested in selling player contracts for cash.
CONCLUSION
The Posting System was meant to address the historically
and legally significant issues surrounding inter-league competi-
tion for players, fans, market, and revenue. The NPB-MLB con-
flict, while related to earlier domestic league competitions, is
unique in that the two leagues are well established and that
their conflict arises from the increasing globalization of enter-
tainment media. The agreement was designed to protect the in-
terests of the NPB while still allowing Japanese players to sign
with MLB teams, but it is becoming increasingly clear that the
agreement as currently written is inadequate to completely re-
solve every issue. By modifying the agreement, the leagues and
players will be better protecting their own interests while hope-
fully reducing the still-present potential for conflict. The NPB is
not going anywhere so long as the sport remains popular in Ja-
pan, but it could face a serious crisis if Japanese fans grow to
prefer the MLB game to such an extent that they also begin to
view the NPB as an inferior league. There is a lot of young tal-
ent in Japan, proven by the fact that a Japanese team has won
three of the last five Little League World Series, 231 and having a
strong Japanese league is really in the best interests of fans,
players, and teams in both nations.
231. Japan Bags Little League World Series, JAPAN TIMES, Aug. 26, 2003, at 20,
available at LEXIS, News Library, The Japan Times File.
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